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a b s t r a c t
Theories of decision-making are routinely based on the notion that decision-makers choose alternatives
which align with their underlying preferences—and hence that their preferences can be inferred
from their choices. In some situations, however, a decision-maker may wish to hide his or her
preferences from an onlooker. This paper argues that such obfuscation-based choice behavior is likely
to be relevant in various situations, such as political decision-making. This paper puts forward a
simple and tractable discrete choice model of obfuscation-based choice behavior, by combining the
well-known concepts of Bayesian inference and information entropy. After deriving the model and
illustrating some key properties, the paper presents the results of an obfuscation game that was
designed to explore whether decision-makers, when properly incentivized, would be able to obfuscate
effectively, and which heuristics they employ to do so. Together, the analyses presented in this
paper provide stepping stones towards a more profound understanding of obfuscation-based decision-
making.





















Models of rational decision-making are routinely based on the
otion that agents base their choices on their latent, underly-
ng preferences—and/or their goals, motivations, desires, needs2;
see prominent examples from the fields of social psychology
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen, 1991), behavioral decision the-
ory (Edwards, 1954; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981), mathematical
psychology (Tversky, 1972; Swait and Marley, 2013), microeco-
nomics (Samuelson, 1948; Houthakker, 1950; Sen, 1971), micro-
econometrics (McFadden, 2001; Walker and Ben-Akiva, 2002;
Arentze and Timmermans, 2009; Marley and Swait, 2017), the
decision sciences (Bell et al., 1988; Keeney and Raiffa, 1993),
and artificial intelligence (Georgeff et al., 1998; Zurek, 2017). In
other words, conventional models of decision-making routinely
postulate that a decision-maker’s latent preferences echo through
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: c.g.chorus@tudelft.nl (C. Chorus).
1 Except for first author, authors are listed in alphabetic order.
2 We are aware that several scholars have made useful distinctions between
hese and related concepts and have ordered them in (cognitive) hierarchies.
hese distinctions and hierarchies are subject to considerable academic debate.
n this paper we do not take a standpoint in this debate. t
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.002
165-4896/© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access ain his3 choices. It may even be said, that the notion that choices
re signals of underlying preferences – as formalized in the re-
ealed preference axioms – lies at the heart of most empirical
ork in decision-making; it is this assumption, which allows
nalysts to estimate preferences based on choice observations
e.g. McFadden, 1974, 2001; Small and Rosen, 1981; Ben-Akiva
t al., 1985; McConnell, 1995; Train, 2009).
The decision-making model presented in this paper adopts a
undamentally different perspective, by postulating that in some
ituations, a decision-maker may wish to hide the preferences
nderlying his choices, from an onlooker. In other words, it cap-
ures the notion that the decision-maker may in some situa-
ions wish to suppress the echo of his preferences. The rea-
ons for such obfuscation-based decision-making may include a
ecision-maker’s wish to protect his privacy, or to avoid legal
unishment or social shame. The proposed model of obfuscation-
ased decision-making is designed to be simple and tractable –
t builds on the well-known concepts of Bayesian inference and
nformation entropy – while still being able to capture subtle
ut important behavioral intuitions. In this paper, we will show
3 For ease of communication, we refer to the decision-maker as ‘‘he’’ and to
he onlooker as ‘‘she’’ throughout this paper, although either the agent and/or
he onlooker may be conceived to be human or artificial (‘‘it’’).rticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).




























































hat although the notion of obfuscation clearly goes against a
undamental premise underlying most decision theories, it is still
ossible to do meaningful normative and empirical analyses with
properly specified obfuscation model.
The notion of obfuscation-based decision-making is conceptu-
lly related to principal–agent interaction and mechanism
esign (Hurwicz, 1973), strategic ambiguity in political decision-
aking (Page, 1976; Kono, 2006), truth serums (Prelec, 2004),
ncentive compatibility (Carson and Groves, 2007), preference-
alsification (Frank, 1996; Kuran, 1997), deception by artificial
gents (Castelfranchi, 2000), privacy protection (Brunton et al.,
017) and covert signaling (Smaldino et al., 2018).
Despite this abundance of related work, this – to the best of
he authors’ knowledge – is the first paper to provide a model
f the decision-making behavior of an agent that wishes to hide
rom an onlooker the latent underlying preferences that govern
is choices. It is important to note at this point, that obfuscation
i.e., hiding preferences from onlookers – is fundamentally dif-
erent from the much more widely studied notion of deception
e.g. Eriksson and Simpson, 2007; Van’t Veer et al., 2014; Biziou-
an-Pol et al., 2015; Danaher, 2020). We conceive deception in
erms of an agent trying to mislead the onlooker into making
er believe that a particular set of preferences underlies his
hoices while in reality, another set of preferences governed his
ecision-making. In contrast, an obfuscating agent has no ‘target’
et of preferences towards which he wants to steer the onlooker’s
eliefs; he merely wants to present the onlooker with as little as
ossible information regarding his preferences. Put colloquially: a
eceiving agent wants the onlooker to give the wrong answer to
he question ‘‘why did he do that?’’, while an obfuscating agent
ants the onlooker to say ‘‘I do not know’’.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
ion 2 presents a model of obfuscation-based decision-making
nd illustrates some of its workings using a concrete, numerical
xample. Section 3 presents the results of an obfuscation game,
esigned to take a first step towards empirical validation of
he obfuscation model. Section 4 concludes, and presents direc-
ions for further research. Four appendices are provided, which
ive important background information: Appendix A elaborates
number of decision-making contexts in which obfuscation is
ikely to be a preferred strategy for the decision-maker (flirtation
n a bar, moral dilemmas, nuclear proliferation); Appendix B ex-
lores, using Monte Carlo analyses, the econometric identification
f parameters in the obfuscation model; Appendix C presents
he instructions as these were provided to participants to the
bfuscation game, and Appendix D presents the choice tasks that
ere used in the game.
. A model of obfuscation-based decision-making
In this section, we provide a formalization of the behavior of
n obfuscating decision-maker. It is important to note, that in
his section we do not yet adopt the perspective of an analyst
ocused on analyzing choices made by a set of decision-makers;
n contrast, we focus on the behavior of an individual decision-
aker; hence, we do not discuss any econometric considerations.
hose will be the topic of Section 3.
Consider a decision-maker whose task is to choose an alterna-
ive from a set A containing J alternatives:
{
a1 . . . aj . . . aJ
}
. Set
contains K attributes (or goals, or criteria) on which the al-
ternatives are assessed: {g1 . . . gk . . . gK }. The extent to which the
decision-maker cares about each particular attribute gk is denoted
by weights βk. Assume for ease of communication, but without
loss of generic applicability, that βk ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,M} ∀k. That is,
if the decision-maker does not care about a particular attribute,
the associated weight equals zero; increasing values reflect in-
creasing importance of the attribute; a weight of M reflects that29the attribute is of the highest importance to the decision-maker.
Scores xkj which are stacked in a K by J matrix X reflect how each
particular alternative scores on each particular attribute; the non-
negative attribute-weights imply that higher scores are preferred
over lower ones. The aggregated utility associated with choosing
alternative aj equals uj =
∑K
k=1 ujk, where ujk = βk · xkj. Note
hat this aggregation reflects a classical linear-additive multi-
ttribute utility approach; other aggregation procedures may be
onsidered as well. Denote the K -dimensional vector containing
he weights of all attributes as β, which defines the decision-
aker’s preferences. The decision-maker’s beliefs are defined as
ollows:
1. He is being watched by an onlooker.
2. The onlooker observes A, G , and X ; she has the same
perception of these vectors and matrix as the agent himself.
3. The onlooker has uninformative prior probabilistic beliefs
P (β) about the weights attached by the agent to different
attributes. She knows that each weight is an element from
the set {0, 1, 2, . . . ,M}. The onlooker’s multidimensional
uninformative prior thus consists of probabilities of size
1/(M + 1)K for each of the (M + 1)K possible states of the
world, where each state is characterized by a realization of
each of the K weights βk.
4. The onlooker observes one choice by the decision-maker
from A, and uses that observation to update her beliefs
about weights β, into posterior probabilities; she does so
using Bayes’ rule. Her posterior probabilities, after having


















Here B represents the domain of β (i.e., it contains all





the well-known Logit-formulation (Luce, 1959; McFadden,
1974) which stipulates that the probability of choosing an
action given a set of preferences increases when the utility
of that action (which is a function of the decision-maker’s















In the following sub-sections, we will present a model of a
‘preference-oriented’ decision-maker who ignores the onlooker
and only cares about making choices that are in line with his pref-
erences; an ‘obfuscation’ agent who is only concerned with hiding
his preferences from the onlooker; and a ‘hybrid’ agent who
attempts to choose in line with his preferences while at the same
time trying to avoid the onlooker learning those preferences. An
illustrative example in the context of political decision-making is
presented thereafter.
A ‘preference-aligned’ decision-maker applies his preferences







βk · xkj (3)
for alternative j; he then chooses the alternative with highest ag-
gregated utility. An obfuscating decision-maker considers that the
remaining uncertainty in the eyes of the onlooker, i.e. after having
observed his choice for aj, is quantified in terms of Shannon
entropy (Shannon, 1948), where we use the decadic logarithm,







































tates of the world and the onlooker’s prior probabilities.
βN = 0 βN = 1 βN = 2
βE = 0 (0,0) (1/9) (0,1) (1/9) (0,2) (1/9)
βE = 1 (1,0) (1/9) (1,1) (1/9) (1,2) (1/9)
βE = 2 (2,0) (1/9) (2,1) (1/9) (2,2) (1/9)
Table 2
Score matrix (political decision-making example: 2 attributes, 3 alternatives).
a1 a2 a3
sE 3 1.5 0
sN 0 1.5 3





. A hybrid decision-maker’s behavior
is driven by a combination of preference-oriented behavior and
entropy maximization, which may be represented by a utility-
maximization process where the utility of an alternative is given
as:







r alternatively, without normalization, as:
j = uj + γ · Hj (5b)
r alternatively, focusing purely on whether or not the considered
lternative is the maximum entropy alternative, as:
j = uj + γ · 1
(
Hj ≥ Hi ∀i ∈ C
)
(5c)
n Eq. (5a), the utility of the most (least) attractive – in terms
f preference-alignment – alternative in the set is denoted as
max (umin). In Eq. (5c), indicator function 1
(
Hj ≥ Hi ∀i ∈ C
)
re-
turns 1 if j generates more entropy than any other alternative
in the choice set (C), and zero otherwise. Note that presumably
these hybrid models (Eqs. (5a)–(5c)) have the strongest base in
behavioral intuition: they represent a decision-maker who wishes
to fulfill his preferences, but who is willing to give up some
preference-related utility if this preserves his privacy in terms of
prohibiting the onlooker to learn his preferences.
Appendix A provides several examples of real-world situa-
tions which may trigger obfuscation-based decision-making; in
this Section, we consider and flesh out the following situation:
a politician faces a public vote in favor of one of a set of 3
policy packages {a1, a2, a3} aimed at developing tourism in a
egion of great natural beauty. Each package is defined in terms
f its economic (E) benefits and its protection of nature (N):
xEj, xNj ∈ [0, 3]. Weights of attributes are βE, βN ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The
decision-maker’s utility function is given by Eq. (5b), where the
preference-aligned part of utility equals uj = βE · xEj + βN · xNj.
Onlookers consist of colleagues in his political party as well as
journalists. Their priors for the politician’s attribute-weights are
1/9 for every state of the world (there being 32 = 9 states of
the world, as implied by a two-dimensional preference with three
possible states for each dimension); see Table 1:
Score-matrix X is as follows (Table 2):
This score matrix reflects that policy package a1 scores very
high on economic developments, but does nothing to protect na-
ture; package a3 scores very high on nature preservation but fails
4 But note that while the obfuscating agent chooses based on Entropy
aximization, he is assumed to believe – see Eq. (2) – that the onlooker
oes not consider the possibility that he might obfuscate; in other words, he
elieves that the onlooker believes that his (the decision-maker’s) choices are
urely preference-aligned. At the end of this section, a more generic approach
s formulated, which creates room for the possibility that the decision-maker
elieves that the onlooker does consider his obfuscation behavior. e
30to bring economic benefits; package a2 is a so-called compromise
alternative (e.g., Simonson, 1989; Kivetz et al., 2004; Chorus and
Bierlaire, 2013) which scores reasonably well on both preference-
dimensions without attaining a stellar performance on either of
them.
Before deriving which alternative is chosen by a politician who
is interested in obfuscating his underlying attribute weights (pref-
erences), let us first discuss why a politician might be tempted to
obfuscate in the first place. Suppose that the politician’s party,
and society as a whole, is deeply divided on the issue (and
that the politician knows this). He has a personal preference for
economic benefits over environmental protection, but his main
focus as a politician is to reduce migration flows into his country;
as such he wants to avoid being drawn into a fight with either
faction of his party (or with large shares of his constituency)
over the tourism vote, also because he wants to save his political
capital – e.g. in the form of bonds with political allies – to spend
it on the migration topic which is much more dear to him. In such
a situation, both a strategy of full transparency, dictating a vote
for the package with greatest economic benefits, and a strategy
of deception, dictating a vote for the package with maximum en-
vironmental protection, would cause problems for the politician
in the sense that either option would suck him into a political
fight that he wishes to avoid. An obfuscation strategy would make
it difficult for onlookers to pinpoint – and subsequently attack –
the politician’s underlying political preferences; it would allow
the politician to ‘duck and cover’, and move on to other political
battles in which he is more interested.5
It is illustrative to derive first what the politician believes
that the onlookers may learn – in terms of updating their flat
priors into more informative posteriors regarding the politician’s
attribute weights – from his choice for a particular policy package.
Applying Eqs. (1) and (2), Fig. 1 presents the onlooker’s posteriors
(to avoid repetition, we focus on alternatives a1 and a2; note that
alternative a3 is the mirror image of alternative a1).
In line with intuition, Fig. 1’s top panel clearly shows that the
politician’s choice for package a1 (which scores high on Economy
and low on Nature) results in the onlookers believing that the
politician’s weight for Economy is higher than that for Nature—
i.e., states of the world (1,0), (2,0) and (2,1) become more likely,
at the expense of states (0,1), (0,2) and (1,2) becoming less likely.
The lower panel illustrates that a choice for compromise package
(a2) which scores reasonably well on both preference-dimensions
informs the onlookers that states (0,0), (1,1) and (2,2) are likely
(each of these representing equal weights for both preference-
dimensions) whereas states (0,2) and (2,0) (which imply that one
attribute is much more important than the other one) become
very unlikely. Also, this is in line with intuition. Note that a choice
for alternative a3 generates posteriors that are the opposite of
those generated by a choice for its mirror image alternative a1;
that is, the posterior probabilities for states (0,0), (1,1) and (2,2)
are the same as for a1, while those for a3’s state (1,2) equal the
posterior for a1’s state (2,1), etc.
Eq. (3) uses these posteriors to give the Entropy associated
with choosing a particular policy package: H1 = H3 = 0.77;H2 =
0.89. It turns out that in this situation, choosing policy pack-
age a2, which represents the compromise option, is the optimal
strategy for a politician who above all else wishes to avoid re-
vealing his true preference-weights to onlookers. This finding
5 In the context of political decision-making, obfuscation is related to the
oncept of strategic ambiguity, although the latter notion does not involve in-
erence of latent preferences from observed choices (e.g. Aragones and Neeman,
000; Jarzabkowski et al., 2010). See also Kono (2006) for a study into the
enefits of obfuscation in political decision-making. Jolink and Niesten (2020)
rovide evidence for the role of signaling in contexts where environmental and
conomic interest are being traded off against each other.













































Fig. 1. Onlookers’ posterior probabilities, having witnessed the politician vote
for a particular policy package (top panel: a1 , lower panel a2).
s in line with intuition: since a compromise option by defi-
ition scores reasonably well on each dimension, a choice for
hat option carries limited information about the weights at-
ached by the decision-maker to different dimensions (compared
o a choice for an option with more extreme performances on
ifferent dimensions). Note that this result contributes to the
iterature on compromise effects in Marketing, Transportation,
ociology, Decision-making and other fields (see earlier cited
apers): compromise alternatives are known to attract dispro-
ortional demand, and various reasons have been put forward to
xplain this phenomenon; a wish to obfuscate is a new potential
partial) explanation for such an effect, particularly in political
ontexts such as the one described in this example.
Crucially, it depends on the politician’s true attribute-weights
hether or not obfuscation is costly to him: in case βE = βN , the
olitician derives an equal amount of ‘preference-aligned utility’
i.e., uj = βE · sEj + βN · sNj) from either policy package in Table 2.
herefore, in that case choosing the obfuscation option is costless
o the politician—i.e., it leads to no loss in u. However, if the
olitician’s true set of attribute-weights were βE = 2, βN = 1,
hoosing the obfuscation alternative (a2) instead of package a1
ould lead to a loss in preference-aligned utility of size 1.5.
hether or not the politician is willing to give up this amount
f preference-aligned utility to increase the onlookers’ Entropy
rom 0.77 to 0.89 depends on the relative importance – i.e., γ
n Eq. (5b) – which he attaches to obfuscation.
As a side note: which policy package is chosen by a deceiving
rather than obfuscating) politician depends on his true attribute-
eights and what he wants the onlookers to believe. For example,
f the politician’s true weights are βE = βN = 1, and when he
ants to make the onlookers believe that he cares less about
he environment than about economic benefits, a choice for a1
ould be the optimal strategy. This strategy boils down to cost-
ess deceit, as the preference-aligned part of utility is the same
or each alternative in the set. However, if the politician’s true
eights were β = 2, β = 1, a choice for alternative a , aimingE N 3
31to deceive the onlookers, would constitute costly deceit as the
preference-aligned part of utility would be 3 units lower than
for alternative a1. Again, it becomes clear that obfuscation and
deception are two very different phenomena, implying different
choices made by decision-makers.
At this point, it is important to return to the assumption, em-
bedded in Eq. (2), that the decision-maker is assumed to believe
that the onlooker presumes that he does not obfuscate. Inspired
by the theory of cognitive hierarchy games pioneered by Camerer
et al. (2004), we call the decision-maker under this assumption
a Level 1 thinker who presumes that the onlooker is a Level 0
thinker. With this we mean that the decision-maker presumes
that he is one step ahead, mentally speaking, of the onlooker who
falsely believes that the decision-maker does not obfuscate, while
he does. This assumption can be rationalized in several ways,
e.g. by pointing at potential over-confidence (cognitive arrogance)
from the side of the decision-maker: he may believe that the
onlooker is cognitively unable to process and optimally respond
to his obfuscation behaviors. But note that even if the decision-
maker believes that the onlooker is equally smart as he is, he
(the decision-maker) might still rightfully anticipate that it would
be more difficult for her (the onlooker) to incorporate his obfus-
cation into her beliefs, than it is for him to obfuscate. Another
possible justification for this Level 1–Level 0 discrepancy could
be that the decision-maker believes that the onlooker is unaware
of his wish to obfuscate. Such a belief may well be justified in
situations where obfuscation is not an obvious strategy, or where
the onlooker is considered naïve by the decision-maker.
In line with the thinking behind cognitive hierarchy games,
we can relax this assumption of Level 1–Level 0 behavior in
cases where it seems less justified, while maintaining, as per
cognitive hierarchy theory, the assumption that the decision-
maker is one step ahead of the onlooker. Let us consider the
situation where the decision-maker obfuscates, by using Eqs. (5a),
(5b), or (5c) with strictly positive obfuscation parameter γ . Now,
ather than assuming that he (the decision-maker) believes that
he onlooker is unaware of, or unable to process, his obfuscation
ehavior, we may assume that the decision-maker believes that
he onlooker does consider the decision-maker’s obfuscations as
art of her thought process. This creates a Level 2–Level 1 con-
tellation, which can be modeled by rewriting the probabilities
f actions conditional on preferences, as presented in Eq. (2), into
he following three variations, depending on the presumed type


























uj + γ · Hj
)∑J









uj + γ · 1
(
Hj ≥ Hi ∀i ∈ C
))∑J
l=1 exp (ul + γ · 1 (Hl ≥ Hi ∀i ∈ C))
(6c)
That is, the decision-maker that uses any of these probabilities
acknowledges that the onlooker takes his inclination to obfuscate
into account when she updates her probabilistic beliefs about
his weights for the attributes (the βs embedded in uj and ul).




stands for the onlooker’s place (‘Level’) in
the cognitive hierarchy, as perceived by the decision-maker. The
absence of a prime stands for Level 0, as in the original model,
while the presence of one prime stands for Level 1, and so forth.









implies that the resulting entropy changes as well. We denote this
new entropy as H ′ . The decision-maker chooses based on H ′ , thatj j





















s he chooses by means of maximizing utility over alternatives j,
efined as either:




H ′j − H ′min
H ′max − H ′min
(7a)
j = uj + γ · H ′j (7b)
j = uj + γ · 1
(
H ′j ≥ H ′ i ∀i ∈ C
)
(7c)
e assume here, that consistent pairs are made between (6a)
nd (7a), and so forth. The fact that the decision-maker believes
hat the onlooker only takes into account the original entropy Hj
hile he uses H ′j in his decision-making, embodies the prevailing
ognitive hierarchy in the eyes of the decision-maker, where
oth decision-maker and onlooker have now moved one step
pwards in the hierarchy. In other words, the decision-maker
till considers himself to be either smarter or less naïve than
he onlooker (or he may believe that they are equally smart and
unning, but that processing obfuscating is more difficult from
he onlooker’s position). As described in Camerer et al. (2004),
uch moving up in the hierarchy can be iteratively continued until
oth the decision-maker and (his perception of) the onlooker
re so sophisticated that the decision-maker’s degree of obfus-
ation has become de facto common knowledge, at which point
the game in the heads of the decision-maker and onlooker has
reached an equilibrium. Empirical data of appropriately specified
game-experiments can be used to estimate the relative position
of the decision-maker/obfuscator and onlooker in the cognitive
hierarchy, as we will show in the next section.
3. Empirical analysis based on an experimental economics
approach
3.1. The obfuscation game
As a first step towards empirically validating the obfuscation
model, an obfuscation game was developed in the tradition of
experimental economics and induced value theory (Smith, 1976;
Davis and Holt, 1993; Loewenstein, 1999; Kagel and Roth, 2016).
That is, participants to our experiment were confronted with a
carefully designed monetary incentive structure.
Incentives were designed such, that obfuscation was the opti-
mal strategy for decision-makers playing the game. This way, by
analyzing choice behavior of players, we were able to explore if –
when properly incentivized – decision-makers would be able to
identify and select the obfuscation option from a set of choice
alternatives. This approach does not aim to explore if people
obfuscate in real life or in experimental conditions that aim to
mimic real life circumstances, but it rather tests the innate ability
of people to obfuscate effectively, in case obfuscation behavior is
the optimal decision-making strategy. As such, this induced value
approach serves only as a very first step towards establishing
empirical validation of the obfuscation model.
The goal of the obfuscation game is twofold: firstly, it aims to
test whether or not, and to what extent, decision-makers succeed
in identifying and selecting from a choice set the alternative
which gives an onlooker minimum information regarding the mo-
tivation that underlies their choice. Secondly, it aims to explore
what types of heuristics and/or cognitive processes are used by
decision-makers in their attempts to obfuscate; this includes an
empirical investigation into which cognitive hierarchy (see the
discussion at the end of the previous section) has presumably
driven the decision-makers’ and onlookers’ choice behavior.
To keep the experiment as tractable and understandable as
possible, we chose to make two simplifications of the model pre-
sented in Section 2. First, we base the game on a situation where
a decision-maker only considers one out of a number of attributes32on which the alternatives are scored, as opposed to considering
many attributes simultaneously, with different weights for each
attribute. Second, each alternative could have one out of the
following three ‘scores’ on each attribute: either the alternative
is forbidden, allowed, or obliged by the attribute. In other words,
the attributes can be thought of as rules; it is up to the onlooker to
identify, based on the observed choice made by a decision-maker,
which rule is followed by him. A particular challenge that has to
be confronted in the design of the game’s incentive structure, is
that we want to clearly distinguish obfuscation (‘hiding’) from
deception (‘misleading’): the two notions are obviously related,
as was discussed above, but the incentive structure needs to be
designed in such a way that obfuscation behavior is optimal for
the decision-maker, while deception is not. The solution for this
challenge is found by designing an incentive structure in which:
1. the decision-maker receives money when the onlooker
does not dare to guess the decision-maker’s rule after he
has made a choice from the set of alternatives;
2. the decision-maker receives no money when the onlooker
attempts to guess his rule, irrespective of whether she
guesses correctly or not;
3. the onlooker receives money when she refrains from guess-
ing the decision-maker’s rule;
4. the onlooker receives more money (compared to the pre-
vious bullet) when she correctly guesses the decision-
maker’s rule;
5. the onlooker receives no money when she incorrectly
guesses the decision-maker’s underlying rule.
The second feature of this pay-off structure allows us to distin-
guish between obfuscation and deception, and to rule out the
latter: the decision-maker gains nothing from misleading the
onlooker (i.e., trying to make her guess wrongly), and only gains
from keeping her sufficiently ‘in the dark’ as to his underly-
ing rule (such as to prevent her from guessing); this is exactly
what obfuscation is about, and how it distinguishes itself from
deception.
After an elaborate series of small-scale pilot studies in which
we observed people play various specifications of the obfuscation
game under slight variations of the incentive structure, the exact
specifications were chosen as follows (note that the full instruc-
tion as read out to participants can be found in Appendix C; the
choice cards are given in Appendix D):
• The game is played in decision-maker-onlooker pairs. Alter-
natingly, a participant plays the role of decision-maker and
of onlooker. Each pair jointly executes ten choice tasks.
• Decision-maker and onlooker are informed about the pay-
off structure for both roles:
• Choice tasks take the form of a 5 by 5 matrix which is
visible to both the decision-maker and the onlooker. Its
rows represent rules, columns represent alternatives. An
alternative is either obliged (!), allowed ( ) or prohibited
(X) by a rule. Note that the designs of the choice tasks for
the obfuscation game were made using the R-package obfus-
catoR (Sandorf et al., 2019). The package was developed by
the authors specifically to test the obfuscation hypothesis.
Fig. 2 presents an example:
• For each choice task, the decision-maker is informed which
rule he must follow (these differ per task; for the task
depicted in Fig. 2, R1 must be followed). This information is
not visible to the onlooker. Upon reading this private infor-
mation and inspecting the publicly visible choice card, the
decision-maker chooses an alternative which is compatible
with his rule. In every choice task, there would always be
three alternatives (out of five) which are compatible with









Fig. 2. Example choice task.Fig. 3. The obfuscation game pay-off structure in normal form.the decision-maker’s rule, together forming his actual choice
set. In the example of Fig. 2, these alternatives are A1, A3,
and A5.
• After having indicated to the onlooker his chosen alter-
native, the onlooker chooses whether or not to guess the
decision-maker’s rule. If she chooses to guess, she tells the
decision-maker which rule she believes governed his behav-
ior.
• Irrespective of whether or not the onlooker guesses, the
decision-maker subsequently informs her of his actual rule
by showing the card on which it was written.
• The decision-maker and the onlooker jointly register this
outcome on the payment form, which is updated by them
after each choice task. The decision-maker receives 10 euro
if the onlooker did not guess; 0 euro otherwise. The onlooker
receives 5 euro if she refrained from guessing; 10 euro if she
guesses correctly; 0 euro otherwise.
• After all ten rounds have been played, a plenary lottery is
organized to draw two (out of ten) choice tasks: one in
which the participant was a decision-maker, one in which
the participant was an onlooker. The monetary outcomes
associated with these drawn choice tasks are added to the
fee of participating (which was 15 euro), and paid to the
individual.
To summarize, Fig. 3 presents the pay-off structure of the game
in normal form.
3.2. Data collection
On Thursday December 6th 2018, the game was played by
2 students (i.e., 31 pairs); they were recruited from among the
20 students taking an MSc-course ‘‘Statistical analysis of choice
ehavior’’. These students had recently obtained knowledge of
hoice modeling and discrete choice theory, but did not have
ny prior knowledge about the notion of obfuscation and how it
ould be modeled or computed, neither did they have knowledge
bout the concept of information entropy.6 Participation was on
6 Clearly, this group does not form a representative sample of the population
t large; this is one more reason why our empirical results should only be33a voluntary basis; it was made clear to participants, that neither
participation nor performance in the game would in any way
influence their grade for the course. Moreover, students were
informed that their personal information would be unavailable
to the lecturer of the course (being the first author of this paper);
hence, the lecturer would not know who played the game and
how well. Informed consent forms were provided to (and signed
by) students before the start of the game, and the game itself
was approved by the university’s Research Ethics Committee; all
relevant documentation can be obtained by emailing the first
author. Playing the game took exactly one hour, including reading
out the instructions, which were also available on paper for
each pair. All participants who started the game, completed it;
the average pay-off was 28.10 euro (which includes a 15 euro
participation fee), with a minimum of 15 euro and a maximum
of 35 euro; note that these were also the theoretical minimum
and maximum.
3.3. Empirical analysis
Before presenting and interpreting the results obtained
through the obfuscation game, it should once again be noted
up front, that – in light of the game’s controlled nature and
the limited size of the sample – these analyses should only be
considered a very first step towards empirical validation of the
obfuscation model.
We start by analyzing to what extent participants succeeded
in obfuscating, i.e., in selecting the alternative whose information
entropy was highest within the choice set of feasible alternatives.
Note that, given the two simplifications mentioned in 4.1, the
process of Entropy maximization can be formalized as follows:
consider an agent whose task is to choose an alternative from
a set A containing 5 alternatives. Set R contains 5 rules, one
of which the agent is assigned to follow. Matrix S which is 5
by 5-dimensional contains scores xkj describing how alternative
aj performs on rule rk. These scores may take on the following
considered only a first step towards validation of the theory of obfuscation-based
decision-making, which should receive further empirical scrutiny in larger, more
representative follow up studies. For this reason, we chose not to register the
usual socio-demographic attributes of participants.

























































alues: skj ∈ {+, 0, −}. In case rk is a so-called strong rule,
kj ∈ {+, −} implying that an alternative (or action) is either
obliged (+) or prohibited (−) by the rule. In case rk is a so-
called weak rule, skj ∈ {0, −} implying that an alternative is
ither permitted (0) or prohibited (−) by the rule. A strong rule
an thus alternatively be seen as a weak rule with only one
lternative being permitted. The agent’s beliefs are as follows: he
s being watched by an onlooker. The onlooker observes A, R, and
S , and has the same perception of these sets and matrix as the
agent himself. The onlooker has uninformative prior probabilistic
beliefs about which rule from R governs the agent’s decision-
making behavior. Specifically: P (rk) = 1/5 for each rule.7 The
nlooker observes one choice by the agent from A, and uses that
bservation to update her probabilistic beliefs about which rule
rom R is adopted by the agent, into posterior probabilities; she
oes so using Bayes’ rule. Specifically, the onlooker’s posterior

















= 1 if aj is









= 0 if aj is prohibited under




= 1/Lk otherwise, where Lk
quals the size of the subset Lk of alternatives permitted under
k. The obfuscating decision-maker considers that the remaining
ncertainty in the eyes of the onlooker, i.e. after having observed














Take the example of choice task A (as in Fig. 2), where al-
ernatives A1, A3, and A5 are allowed by the decision-maker’s
ule (R1); following the above model, A1’s entropy equals 0.6,
hereas that of A3 and A5 equals 0.47. Thus, in the context of
his choice task, and given the decision-maker’s rule-assignment,
lternative A1 is the obfuscation alternative as it generates max-
mum entropy for an onlooker with uninformative priors. Each
hoice task was designed in such a way, that there would always
e one alternative whose entropy was higher than that of all other
lternatives available to the decision-maker—that is, there would
lways be one alternative whose selection would be optimal for
n obfuscating decision-maker.
Results obtained from analyzing the choices made by decision-
akers are encouraging, when it comes to their capacity to iden-
ify the maximum entropy alternative from the choice set. To
tart with, in nine out of ten choice tasks, the maximum entropy
lternative had the highest ‘market share’ of the three alternatives
n the choice set of feasible alternatives. The exception is choice
ask 10 (see Appendix B), where alternative 4 had a lower entropy
han the highest-entropy alternative 5 (0.41 versus 0.48) but
as slightly more often chosen by decision-makers (15 times
ersus 13 times). Furthermore, in nine out of ten choice tasks, the
owest entropy alternative – that is, the alternative which most
learly gives away the decision-maker’s rule – had the lowest
arket share. The exception being choice task 7 (see Appendix B),
here alternative 3 has the lowest entropy (0.3) and was chosen
y 4 decision-makers, whereas alternative 2 has a somewhat
7 As part of our empirical analyses, we tested this assumption of uniform
riors versus an alternative assumption that a probability of (almost) zero is
ssigned to strong rules which only allow one action. The idea behind this latter
ssumption is that, although our instructions to participants made it clear that
lso strong rules were possible candidates to be assigned to decision-makers,
uch a rule would not leave the decision-maker with a choice between different
ctions and as such might have been considered an unlikely candidate rule by
layers of the game. Our empirical analyses – which can be obtained from the
irst author but are not reported here for reasons of space limitations – suggest
hat the assumption of uniform priors provides a closer fit with the observed
hoice data than its non-uniform counterpart.34higher entropy (0.41) but was chosen by 3 decision-makers. In
59% of choices made by decision-makers (i.e., 193 out of 310),
the maximum entropy alternative was chosen; this should be
compared with a benchmark of 33% random chance given the size
of the feasible choice set, which as mentioned earlier contained
three alternatives in each choice task. Only in 9% of cases (29
out of 310), did the decision-maker select the minimum entropy
alternative—this too, should be benchmarked against the chance
probability of 33%. For a more detailed analysis, we created an
entropy index, which assigns the value 0 to the entropy of the
minimum entropy alternative in a particular choice set of feasible
alternatives and the value 1 to the entropy of the maximum
entropy alternative in that set. Using this index, we find that the
mean index-value associated with the decision-maker’s choice
equals 0.80; colloquially, this implies that on average, decision-
makers succeeded in generating 80% of the potential entropy that
is ‘available’ to them in a choice task.
Given this fairly successful obfuscation behavior exhibited by
decision-makers, it comes as no surprise that the onlooker in
most cases did not dare to guess the decision-maker’s underlying
rule, although it is likely that risk aversion has also played a
role, noting that for not guessing the onlooker could earn 5 euro
easily. More specifically, only in 17% of cases (51 out of 310) did
the onlooker guess the decision-maker’s rule; and only in 37% of
those cases (19 out of 51), did she do so correctly. This further
corroborates our finding that participants to the experiments
succeeded quite well in hiding their rules from the onlooker.
Following our assessment of the extent to which participants
succeeded in obfuscating their rules, we now attempt to answer
the question how they obfuscated, i.e., which heuristic, if any,
was used. It should be noted, that we refrained from asking
decision-makers directly how they arrived at their choices, thus
relying solely on observed choice patterns to identify and com-
pare heuristics. This is in line with the well-established notion,
that people’s explanations of why and how they arrived at certain
decisions tend to be unreliable post-hoc rationalizations, offering
little insight into actual decision processes (Nisbett and Wilson,
1977; Haidt, 2001). We distinguish between two heuristics, and
we compare them with the sophisticated mechanism assumed in
the obfuscation model (based on Bayesian learning and entropy
maximization):
1. For each of the feasible alternatives, count the number of
rules that support the alternative, and choose the alterna-
tive that is supported by the maximum number of rules.
Note that for each choice task in the game, the maximum
entropy alternative is also supported by the maximum
number of rules, but in no less than eight out of ten choice
tasks, following this heuristic fails to unambiguously iden-
tify the maximum entropy alternative (i.e., there would be
a tie between two alternatives).
2. For each of the feasible alternatives, identify which rules
support (i.e., oblige or permit) the alternative. For each of
these rules, count the number of alternatives supported by
this rule. Sum those numbers across rules, and maximize
the outcome (over the feasible alternatives). Following this
heuristic, which is more sophisticated than the previous
one, always leads to unambiguous identification of the
maximum entropy alternative in the context of the choice
tasks used in our game.
The first heuristic is straightforward: it is based on the intuitive
notion that when an alternative is supported by (‘compatible
with’ or ‘explainable in terms of’) many rules, this makes it
difficult for the onlooker to guess, having observed a choice for
the alternative, which rule led to this choice. Take the choice
task presented in Fig. 4 (which is choice task I as presented in














































Fig. 4. Example choice task.ppendix D): here, alternatives A2, A3, and A4 form the feasible
et, given the decision-maker’s rule R4.
Alternative A2 is supported by 3 rules, A3 by 2 rules, and A4 by
rules. Their entropies are 0.48, 0.24, and 0.41 respectively. Fol-
owing the heuristic ‘‘counting the number of supporting rules’’
ould lead to a choice for either A2 or A4; indeed this subset
ontains the maximum entropy alternative (A2), but the decision-
aker following this heuristic is left with a tie between the
wo alternatives. This tie can be avoided or broken, by following
he second heuristic: alternative A2 is supported by three rules,
hich each support three alternatives, leading to a value of 9 for
lternative A2. A similar counting exercise leads to the value 7
or A4 (and a value of 4 for A3). Maximization implies a choice
or A2, which indeed is the maximum entropy alternative. The
ntuition behind this more sophisticated heuristic is as follows:
bfuscation consists of making the link between an alternative
nd the rule which led to the alternative as unclear as possible.
his can be done by maximizing the number of rules that support
particular alternative, but an additional factor that may be taken
nto account, is to ensure that those rules that support your
lternative, also support as many as possible other alternatives.
his additional aspect is captured in the second heuristic. Em-
loying this second, more sophisticated heuristic highlights a key
ifference between A4 and A2: R2, being one of the rules which
upports A4, supports no other alternative, while each of the
ules supporting A2 supports several other alternatives as well.
his makes that the onlooker has more difficulty guessing the
nderlying rule from A2 compared with A4.
Empirical analysis of our data show that in 90% of cases (278
ut of 310), the chosen alternative had the highest number of
upporting rules within the feasible choice set, possibly tied with
nother alternative. More specifically, in the two choice tasks
here there was no such tie, 74% of choices was for the alter-
ative that was supported by the maximum number of rules;
his should be benchmarked against 33% random chance. In those
ight choice tasks where two out of three feasible alternatives
ad the highest number of supporting rules (i.e., where following
euristic 1 leads to a tie), 94% of decision-makers selected one of
he two alternatives with the highest number of supporting rules;
his should be benchmarked against 67% random chance. These
esults suggest that heuristic 1 has helped participants in their
earch for the obfuscation – i.e., maximum entropy – alternative.
Regarding heuristic 2 – which, in addition to maximizing the
umber of rules supporting a particular alternative, also considers
nd maximizes how many alternatives are supported by each
f those supporting rules – we find that in 59% of cases (183
ut of 310), the selected alternative was compatible with this
ore sophisticated heuristic; this should be benchmarked against
3533% random chance. Interestingly, in those cases where following
heuristic 1 would lead to a tie between two alternatives, the al-
ternative compatible with heuristic 2 was selected in 62% of cases
(which should be benchmarked against 50% random chance),
suggesting that heuristic 2 may in some cases have been used
as a tie-breaker.
To refine our analysis beyond the descriptive statistics pre-
sented above, we estimated a series of Logit-models based on
(combinations of) heuristics, see Table 3. For the decision-maker
(DM), the unit of analysis is the multinomial choice for a particu-
lar alternative from the set of three feasible alternatives. Results
can be summarized as follows, focusing first on models DM1-3:
for the decision-maker, parameters are of the expected positive
sign and they are all significant, signaling that an alternative’s
chance of being selected, increases if: the number of rules sup-
porting the alternative increases (DM1); the summation, across
rules supporting an alternative, of the number of alternatives
supported by that rule, increases (DM2); the Entropy of the
alternative increases (DM3). The Ben-Akiva and Swait (1986)
test for non-nested models suggests that best-fitting model DM3
performs better than the second best-fitting model (DM1) with a
p-value of 0.011.
Model DM4 is a variation of model DM3, the difference being
that DM4 assumes a Level 2 – Level 1 hierarchical constellation
while DM3 assumes a Level 1 – Level 0 hierarchical constellation
(see the end of Section 2). In other words, DM4 is based on the
assumption that the decision-maker believes that the onlooker is
aware of the fact that he obfuscates; and that she (the onlooker)
also processes this when deciding to guess or not. In light of the
rules of the game played by the decision-maker and the onlooker,
this assumption seems more realistic than the one embedded in
DM3, which is that the decision-maker believes that the onlooker
fails to process his obfuscation behavior in her decision whether
or not to guess. In notation: DM3, as discussed earlier, assumes
that the decision-maker believes that the onlooker believes that





= 1/Lk, where Lk equals the size of the subset
Lk of alternatives permitted under rk. In contrast, DM4 assumes
that the decision-maker believes that the onlooker believes that
he would choose from the actions allowed by his rule, according
to a Logit model that assigns a high probability to actions whose








. This leads to a different
entropy H ′j compared to that of the initial model (Hj). While DM4
is still based on the notion that the decision-maker (believes he)
is one step ahead of the onlooker, both have now climbed one
level higher on the cognitive hierarchy ladder.
Estimation results suggest that the choices made by decision-
makers in the obfuscation game are slightly better explained












































Agent ID Utility function β̂ SE(β̂) (rob.) LL0 LLβ̂
Decision-maker
DM1 Vj = βDMR · Rj 1.68 0.19 −340.6 –270.5
DM2 Vj = βDMRS · RSj 0.41 0.04 −340.6 –285.7
DM3 Vj = βDMH · Hj 10.8 1.25 −340.6 –267.3
DM4 Vj = βDMH · H
′
j 10.1 1.15 −340.6 –266.8
Onlooker
O1 Vg = βOR · RDM −1.01 0.39 −214.9 –134.5
O2 Vg = βORS · RSDM −0.25 0.09 −214.9 –134.7
O3 Vg = βOH · HDM −3.66 0.33 −214.9 –134.8
O4 Vg = βOH · H
′
DM −3.67 0.47 −214.9 –137.3by model DM4 than DM3, suggesting that cognitive hierarchy
constellation Level 2 – Level 1 fits the data slightly better than
constellation Level 1 – Level 0, but the difference in final log-
likelihood is too small to attach much certainty to this finding:
the Ben-Akiva and Swait test suggest a p-value associated with
he difference in model fit equaling 0.159. This implies that the
ifference in model fit is only significant at a modest 10%-level, if
one-tailed test is applied based on the notion that the rules of
he game, which were common knowledge, make it reasonable
o expect that decision-makers anticipate that onlookers take
nto account their (the decision-makers’) obfuscation in their own
ecision-making processes.
Finally, we estimate models of onlooker behavior. Here, the
nit of analysis is a binary choice to guess (denoted g in Table 3)
r not, having been presented with the alternative selected by the
ecision-maker. Note that constants were estimated, but found
o be far from significant, and left out of the final models. Results
an be summarized as follows. Again, we focus first on models
1–O3: for the onlooker, parameters are of the expected negative
ign and they are all significant, signaling that the onlooker’s
robability of guessing decreases if: the number of rules support-
ng the alternative chosen by the decision-maker increases (O1);
he summation, across rules supporting the alternative chosen
y the decision-maker, of the number of alternatives supported
y that rule, increases (O2); the Entropy of the alternative cho-
en by the decision-maker increases (O3). The Ben-Akiva and
wait (1986) test for non-nested models suggests that best-fitting
odel O3 does not perform significantly better than the second
est-fitting model (O1); the corresponding p-value equals 0.081.
omparing the log-likelihoods of models O4 and O3, it appears
hat there is no evidence for the assumption, embedded in model
4, that the onlooker takes into account that the decision-maker
nticipates that she (the onlooker) takes into account his (the
ecision-maker) obfuscation behavior.
To sum up: results suggest that in the obfuscation game,
oth players’ behavior fits a Level 2–Level 1 cognitive hierarchy
herein the onlooker takes into account the decision-maker’s
bfuscation behavior (as opposed to presuming that he selects
ctions at random), while the decision-maker takes into account
his awareness from the side of the onlooker, as such remaining
ne step ahead of her.
. Conclusions and directions for further research
This paper puts forward a model that is based on the postulate
hat decision-makers in some situations may wish to hide the
7 Note that we also tested various combinations of heuristics, as well as latent
lass models (each class representing a different heuristic) for both the decision-
aker as the onlooker, but unsurprisingly, those models led to highly correlated
stimates and no improvements in model fit, reflecting the intrinsic difficulty of
istinguishing subtly different (obfuscation) heuristics based on observed choice
atterns alone.36latent preferences governing their observable choices from an
onlooker. As elaborated in Appendix A, such obfuscation-based
behavior may be relevant in various agent–onlooker interactions.
The paper presents a model that is rich enough to capture impor-
tant yet subtle intuitions regarding obfuscation-based decision-
making (and to clearly distinguish obfuscation from deceit), while
maintaining a high level of tractability. After discussing and il-
lustrating the workings of the model, and elaborating how it can
be framed in the tradition of cognitive hierarchy games (Camerer
et al., 2004), we present the results of an obfuscation game
that is developed in the tradition of experimental economics.
Results of this first step towards empirical validation of the ob-
fuscation mode can be summarized as follows: when properly
incentivized, participants are rather successful in identifying and
selecting from a choice set the obfuscation alternative which gen-
erates maximum entropy to an onlooker. And: obfuscation-based
decision-making behavior tends to align with simple heuristics,
but there is also evidence of more sophisticated considerations
by decision-makers. In particular, our findings suggest that a
cognitive hierarchy was present where the onlooker anticipated
obfuscation behavior from the side of the decision-maker, while
the decision-maker by taking this into account stayed one step
ahead of the onlooker.
In the process of designing a tractable obfuscation model,
trade-offs were made, which we will not obfuscate but rather
highlight, as they may provide useful starting points for further
research: to start with, we focused on a one-shot application,
where the decision-maker chooses an alternative from a set once.
A natural model extension would be to consider a repeated choice
situation. Related to this, we have focused on decision-maker
behavior only, whereas future research may also consider (active)
behavior by the onlooker. For example, the onlooker may be given
the task to design a choice set for the decision-maker to choose
from. In a repeated choice setting, onlookers and decision-makers
will then interact in terms of providing choice sets (the onlooker)
and choosing from those sets (the decision-maker). In such a
model, the attribute weight-posteriors obtained by the onlooker
in one choice situation may be used as attribute weight-priors for
the next one.
A related direction for further theoretical research would be
to relax the assumption that onlooker and agent share the same
knowledge concerning the set of attributes, the set of alterna-
tives, and the score of each alternative on each attribute. More
generally, the models proposed in this paper can be extended
by relaxing their underlying assumptions regarding, for example,
the number of attributes and alternatives in the choice set (what
happens to obfuscation behavior when attributes or alternatives
are added to or removed from the set?) and the updating process
including our use of an uninformative prior (what happens when
other update processes are considered, and when priors are based
on previous experience and hence not completely uninforma-
tive?). Studying such adaptations are worthwhile directions for
further research.






















































































In a more general sense, one could argue that this paper
uts much weight on the conceptual introduction of obfuscation
aximization and on how to model this as a behavioral phe-
omenon, introducing only a limited degree of formalization. In
uture work, the obfuscation model should be embedded within
more axiomatic and rigorous formal framework, which for
xample would elaborate under which conditions obfuscation is a
ational (optimal) decision strategy. Strong contenders for frame-
orks which would allow for such meta-reasoning are game
heory, e.g. the use of repeated Von Stackelberg games (Von Stack-
lberg, 2010), and the belief–desire-intention formalism used
n the artificial intelligence (‘multi-agent systems’) community
Georgeff et al., 1998). We consider the development of such
mproved formalizations to be core avenues for future research.
Furthermore, one could see obfuscation-based decision-
aking as a special case of a more general class of informa-
ion regulation models, which presume that decision-makers
re aware of, and actively manage, the amount of information
oncerning their preferences which is signaled through their
hoices to observers. The opposite extreme, and another special
ase of such information regulation behavior, is the notion of
ull transparency, where a decision-maker makes choices that
rovide purposely clear signals about his preferences, e.g. to
ignal his morality or social status. Such entropy-minimization
ehavior could be linked to the well-known phenomenon of
conspicuous consumption’ (e.g., Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996).
As a final note, although our empirical results can be con-
idered promising, it is important to again highlight that they
rovide only very first steps towards validation and exploration of
bfuscation-based decision-making. Aside from the usual caveats
elating to experimental economics work, we must also mention
ere that the careful design of the incentive structure (including
he use of small-scale pilots) could have inadvertently led to
o-called forking, which increases the likelihood of finding sta-
istically significant effects due to pure chance (Gelman and Lo-
en, 2013). Crucially, follow up research would need to consider
ore real-life situations and larger, more representative samples,
oving from the realm of experimental economics (where pref-
rences and obfuscation mechanisms are induced by the analyst)
o other tools for empirical data collection such as stated choice
xperiments and revealed choice data sets. Our Monte Carlo anal-
ses provide some initial confidence that if obfuscation behavior
s present in such data, a properly specified choice model could be
ble to retrieve it in a process of maximum likelihood estimation.
he analyses presented in this paper may thus serve as guidance
or these important next steps in understanding and modeling
bfuscation-based decision-making.
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hich we are grateful.37Appendix A. Examples of situations that may trigger
obfuscation-based decision-making
As will be made clear in a series of examples, there may be
compelling reasons why, in certain situations, obfuscation may
be more beneficial to the agent than either being transparent
or deceiving the onlooker. Every example follows a similar line
of reasoning: a situation is described in which an agent faces a
choice from a set of alternatives. Some of these alternatives would
give away his latent preferences, while other alternatives would
either obfuscate or deceive the onlooker. It is then discussed
why, in these particular situations, obfuscation may be the best
strategy for the agent. Note that in these examples, we will use
different terms (goals, preferences, principles, rules, etc.) for the
latent construct that governs choices, depending on what makes
most sense in the particular context.
A.1. Obfuscation in flirtation
To start on a relatively light-hearted note: consider the situa-
tion where the agent is having a drink in a bar, and a small group
of friends enters the room. The agent has a romantic interest in
one of the friends, and faces a choice from a set of alternative
actions, including: whether or not to start a conversation with
the group; with one of the group members in particular; offer one
or all of them a drink; ignore them altogether, etc. A strategy of
full transparency would dictate that the agent actively engages
with the one group member whom he has a romantic interest
in, immediately starting a conversation and perhaps offering him
or her a drink. From such actions, the onlooker(s) would easily
infer the preference of the agent. However, there may be several
reasons why an agent would not want to use this strategy of full
transparency, one compelling reason being that if the subject of
his romantic interest turns out not to be interested in him, he
would face public embarrassment.
A strategy of deception on the other hand would dictate that
the agent could either choose actions that signal his lack of
interest in his subject of interest or in any of the group’s members
(e.g. by ignoring them altogether), or choose actions that would
signal his interest in another member of the group (e.g. by actively
ourting that other person). A clear disadvantage of such a decep-
ion strategy is that, while it could help avoid embarrassment,
he chance that the agent will end up satisfying his romantic
reference is small given this strategy. A strategy of obfuscation
ould dictate, that the agent acts in a way that on the one
and increases the likelihood of getting the positive attention
f his subject of interest, while on the other hand reducing the
robability of immediately and fully giving away his romantic in-
erest and subsequently being embarrassed. One such obfuscation
ction would be to engage casually with the group as a whole,
nd gradually focusing attention towards the subject of interest,
n case small positive signals are received from his or her side.
.2. Obfuscation in a moral dilemma
Consider the situation where an agent is faced with a moral
ilemma while being observed by his social peers. Specifically,
ach of the alternative actions available to the agent will violate
mportant moral principles while adhering to other important
oral principles. For example, in the situation where the agent
as cheated on his partner, actions could include ‘do everything
ou can to avoid your partner from finding out’ and ‘tell your
artner what happened’. The former of these would prioritize
he moral principle ‘do not harm a loved one’, while the latter
ould prioritize the moral principle ‘do not lie to a loved one’.
he agent anticipates that his actions are observable to his friends



















































































the onlookers – which, after having observed the agent’s choice
or a particular action, will use that choice to infer which moral
rinciple has presumably guided his choice. The agent anticipates
hat based on this inference, some of the onlookers will ‘pun-
sh’ him with indignation, contempt or worse, if they believe
hat the wrong moral principle is prioritized. A strategy of full
ransparency (to his friends) would dictate that the agent fully
ligns his action(s) with his guiding moral principle. This implies
hat, depending on his principle, either (and somewhat ironically)
e makes a genuine attempt to make sure his partner does not
ind out, or that he tells his partner what happened. A strategy
f deception would dictate that the agent deliberately tries to
islead his friends regarding his moral priorities: for example, in
ase the agent’s true priority is not to lie to his partner, then he
ould mislead his friends if his actions would signal to them that
is priority is not to harm his partner (e.g. by actively avoiding
hat his partner would find out).
For any of these strategies to work, the agent must first know
is own, true moral priorities. However, it is well established
hat in many moral dilemmas, humans have a very hard time
iguring out which moral principle should take priority (Forsyth
nd Nye, 1990; Sunstein, 2005; Gigerenzer, 2010; Capraro and
and, 2018). In addition, the deception strategy can only work
f the onlookers share one moral priority and if the agent knows
his. In many situations, one or both of these two conditions will
ot be met, making deception an ineffectual or even impossible
trategy. An obfuscating strategy may remedy this problem, by
aking it unclear to onlookers which moral principle has guided
he agent’s actions. One such action could be, not to actively
nform one’s partner but at the same time not to make active
ttempts to hide the cheating. By choosing this course of action,
he agent can claim to adhere to both moral principles at once,
r at least not to actively violate any of them.8
.3. Obfuscation in nuclear non-proliferation
Consider the situation where a state wishes to keep its nuclear
ptions open, in the sense that it wishes to create an ability
o develop a nuclear weapon in the future—in case geopolitical
evelopments would demand that. In this vein, the state pursues
program of technological developments that would enable it, if
eed be, to jumpstart the rapid development of a nuclear weapon.
he international community, represented by the International
tomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of which the state is a member,
udits such technological programs to ensure that no state other
han those who already have nuclear weapons, develops them.
mportantly, the IAEA does allow for the development of nuclear
echnology for non-military (e.g., energy) purposes, and some
f the technology needed to develop nuclear weapons is so-
alled dual use: it can be used for either energy or military
urposes. However, some of these dual use technologies are more
8 A related situation to a moral dilemma concerns biases: human decision-
akers are known to have several biases regarding for example gender and
thnicity (Greenwald et al., 1998). When an agent knows that his actions are
eing observed by an onlooker, and when he is aware that his behaviors may
e biased in certain ways, he may wish to choose actions which, while still
eing more or less in line with the his ‘biased’ preferences, are difficult for
he onlooker to interpret as clear evidence of biased decision-making. Such an
ttempt to avoid being caught out as biased is subtly different from deceit, which
ould involve an active attempt by the agent to signal that he is unbiased or
erhaps even to signal he is ‘biased’ in favor of certain minorities. See Beyer
nd Liebe (2015) for empirical evidence of such behavior: the authors find that
hen an individual believes that there is an anti-Semitic consensus, he or she
s more likely to be open about his or her own anti-Semitic views (if any); the
bsence of perceived consensus makes the individual more likely to hide such
iews. See Schilke and Rossman (2018) for a study into the role of obfuscation
n morally sensitive choice situations. i
38effective for energy-related purposes, others being more effective
for weapon development. The alternative actions available to
the state agent are specific paths of technological development.
The onlooker (IAEA) observes the actions chosen, and from them
tries to infer whether the underlying motivation is energy- or
military-related. A strategy of full transparency would imply that
the state actor would choose the technological development-
path which scores best on the goal ‘prepare for future nuclear
weapon development’. This would obviously trigger sanctions
of the IAEA and potential geopolitical isolation. A strategy of
deception would imply that the state actor would choose the
technological development-path which scores best on the goal
‘build a nuclear energy system’. This would clearly avoid sanc-
tions, but at the same time it would not bring the state much
closer to its true goal. An obfuscation strategy would go some
way to help avoid both these disadvantages: it would imply
acquiring those dual use technologies that score reasonably well
on both goals, even if the technology is not the most effective
one on either goal. Such a compromise makes it hard for the
onlooker to learn the true goals of the agent, while the agent
does not handicap himself in the process, by foregoing crucial
technologies.
A.4. In sum: reasons to obfuscate rather than being transparent or
deceiving
There are various reasons why an agent would be tempted
to obfuscate (i.e. ‘‘create a smoke-screen’’) rather than simply
giving away his latent goals by means of allowing an onlooker
to easily learn them based on observing the agent’s choice. The
agent might be afraid that he will be punished if the onlooker
learns his goals. This punishment may take the form of rejec-
tion (the flirtation example), contempt (the infidelity example),
political damage (the tourism policy example in the main text)
or far-reaching geopolitical consequences (the non-proliferation
example). It is crucial at this point to note that motivations be-
hind actions form an important determinant of legal punishment
(Hart, 1958; Foucault, 1977), as shows for example in the legal
distinction between manslaughter and murder. More generally
speaking, it is well recognized in the fields of ethics and moral
psychology that ‘moral punishment’, e.g. in terms of contempt or
indignation, refers to motivations underlying moral actions rather
than the actions themselves9 (e.g. Alfano, 2016). This provides
clear incentive for the agent to create ‘‘reasonable doubt’’ (in
legal setting) or ‘‘moral wriggle room’’ (in a moral dilemma).
specially when the agent is uncertain about his own goals, or
hen he has no strong goal importance hierarchy, he may wish
o avoid onlookers pinning him down on a particular goal. In all
uch cases, hiding your goals may be a better strategy than letting
hem echo through clearly in your choices.
In such situations where agents are reluctant to be transparent
bout their latent goals, there are various reasons why an agent
ould be tempted to obfuscate rather than deceive. First, the
gent may simply be unaware of what are considered – by the
nlooker – to be ‘good’ and ‘bad’ goals or motivations, making
eceit an irrational strategy. This reason becomes even more
alient when there are multiple onlookers with conflicting ideas
bout what is right or wrong. Second, the agent may believe that
eceit is more easy for an onlooker to spot than obfuscation,
9 For example, when someone is being pushed over while crossing the street,
hat person is most likely not going to be angry with the ‘aggressor’, when the
atter explains that his motivation for his act was to save the individual from
eing hurt by an oncoming car (irrespective of whether the car was actually
ikely to have hit the individual). Things are very different of course, when
he aggressor makes it clear that his act was motivated by a wish to hurt the
ndividual.



























nd more costly (to the agent) in terms of punishment than
bfuscation, in case the onlooker finds out. Thirdly, deceit may in
act harm the agent by hampering his abilities to reach his goals,
s was illustrated in the flirtation and non-proliferation cases.
ppendix B. Identification of the obfuscation model—aMonte
arlo analysis
Whereas the main text of the paper formalized obfuscation
ehavior of an individual decision-maker, in this Appendix, we
ove to the perspective of parameter identification by a de-
ision analyst in the context of a dataset containing choices
esulting from (possible) obfuscation-based choice behavior by a
et of decision-makers. The situation we consider is one where
ecision-makers, onlookers and decision analyst have the follow-
ng behaviors:
• The decision-maker makes a choice from a set of three
alternatives j that are defined in terms of their scores x
on two attributes; he may be concerned with obfuscation
and/or with preference-aligned behavior. More specifically,
the decision-maker maximizes random utility, and his utility
function for alternative j is specified as Uj = β1xj1 + β2xj2 +
γ · Ij
{
Hj ≥ Hi∀i ∈ C
}
+ εj, where β1 = 1 and β2 = 2. That is,
an alternative’s utility consists of the sum of (i) a weighted
summation of the alternative’s scores on the two attributes
and their corresponding attribute weights, the second at-
tribute being twice as important to the decision-maker as
the first one; (ii) an indicator function which returns one
if the alternative is the maximum entropy (i.e., obfusca-
tion) option in the choice set and zero otherwise,10 multi-
plied by an obfuscation weight γ ; (iii) an iid Extreme Value
Type I error term with variance equaling π2/6. Note that
if the obfuscation weight equals zero, the model collapses
to a standard linear additive random utility maximization
based Logit model. If it is positive, its size determines the
extent to which obfuscation of his preferences is impor-
tant to the decision-maker, compared to maximizing the
preference-aligned part of utility.
• The onlooker11 may be a real person or a mere mental
representation in the mind of the decision-maker (think
of the ‘moral persona’ invoked in Adam Smith’s writings).
Note that in case the onlooker is real, it is not her actual
behavior that is of interest, but rather the decision-maker’s
beliefs regarding her behavior. His beliefs are as follows, and
fall in the cognitive hierarchy constellation Level 1–Level
0: the onlooker inspects the choice made by him, and she
attempts to infer, from that choice, his attribute weights
β1, β2. She does so using the Bayesian learning scheme
presented in Eqs. (1) and (2) presented in Section 2. For
ease of exposition, we adopt the same settings as in the
example presented in that Section. That is, the choice set
10 We obtained similar outcomes based on model specifications that include
ntropy directly (e.g. using Eq. (5b)), as opposed to through an indicator
unction. It is important to consider, in such a specification, that the variation in
ntropy across alternatives should preferably be roughly similar to the variation
cross alternatives in their attribute values. This can be achieved by, for example,
e-scaling entropy differences which tend to be small compared to differences
n attribute values.
11 We distinguish between an onlooker and a decision analyst, and assume
hat the decision-maker is aware of the onlooker but is unaware of (or
gnores) the analyst in his considerations and decision-making. Alternatively,
ne could study the situation where the analyst is the onlooker, and where the
ecision-maker attempts to hide his preferences from the onlooker–analyst. This
lternative framing would lead to a slightly different conceptualization of the
otion of obfuscation, but otherwise the results and conclusions we draw would
lso apply to that case.39contains three alternatives, there are two attribute weights,
and the onlooker is uncertain about which element of the
set {0, 1, 2} represents the decision-maker’s weight for any
particular attribute. (Note that we tested several variations
of these attribute weights, leading to similar results.) Before
observing the choice, the onlooker assigns an uninformative
prior probability of 1/9 to each of the following nine states
of the world: {β1 = 0, β2 = 0}; {β1 = 0, β2 = 1};
{β1 = 0, β2 = 2}; {β1 = 1, β2 = 0}; {β1 = 1, β2 = 1};
{β1 = 1, β2 = 2}; {β1 = 2, β2 = 0}; {β1 = 2, β2 = 1};
{β1 = 2, β2 = 2}.
• The decision analyst receives a dataset containing 10,000
choice observations, consisting of one choice each made
by 10,000 decision-makers (note that we checked that our
conclusions also hold for considerably smaller datasets, e.g.
containing 500 cases). Each decision-maker has the same
attribute weights (i.e., β1 = 1 and β2 = 2 as mentioned
above) but is confronted with a different choice task: at-
tribute values xj1 and xj2 (for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) were randomly
– across alternatives and choice tasks – drawn from the
interval [0,1]. Throughout our Monte Carlo analyses, we
systematically vary the obfuscation parameter γ but keep
it constant across decision-makers. The analyst identifies
parameters by means of maximum likelihood estimation.
We distinguish between three cases: first, the analyst may
be ‘naive’ and believe that the decision-maker’s utility func-
tion is characterized as Uj = β1xj1 + β2xj2 + εj. That
is, the analyst does not consider that the decision-maker
might have been trying to obfuscate an onlooker. Second,
the analyst may be ‘prepared’, allowing for the possibility
that the decision-maker might have been trying to obfuscate
an onlooker, while not knowing if and to what extent this is
the case. In this case, the analyst assumes the utility function
which was described further above: Uj = β1xj1 + β2xj2 +
γ · Ij
{
Hj ≥ Hi∀i ∈ C
}
+ εj. Here, the analyst attempts to
estimate attribute weights and the obfuscation parameter
jointly. Third, the analyst may be ‘informed’ and actually
know the decision-makers’ obfuscation parameter γ ; given
perfect knowledge about this parameter, the analyst sets
out to estimate the decision-makers’ attribute weights. Note
that this third case is rather unrealistic, and will only serve
as a reference or benchmark for the other two cases.
The main question that our Monte Carlo experiment attempts to
answer can be put as follows: in case γ > 0, i.e., when decision-
makers have attempted to obfuscate their attribute weights from
a real or imagined onlooker, would the analyst still be able to
identify the obfuscation parameter, which gives the degree of
obfuscation, jointly with β1 and β2, which give the true attribute
weights which the decision-makers have attempted to hide from
the onlooker?
Before presenting our results, one important remark needs
to be made: entropy Hi is a function of the decision-maker’s
beliefs regarding uncertainty in the mind of the onlooker. As such,
entropy is based on the decision-maker’s beliefs as to how the
onlooker will use an observed choice to update a prior distribu-
tion regarding his preferences (attribute weights) into a posterior
distribution. Crucially, from the analyst’s viewpoint, this entropy
is a data point which may be computed based on the choice
task, before the process of model estimation; it is not a func-
tion of the analyst’s estimates of the attribute weights. In other
words, in the process of model estimation, i.e., the process of
finding the maximum likelihood attribute weights (and entropy
parameter), the entropy itself is invariant; see also the probability
statement in Appendix B, where this is elaborated. It should also
be noted that our analyses presuppose that the analyst is aware













f the decision-maker’s beliefs about the onlooker’s priors and
bout how the onlooker would update those based on the choice
ade by the decision-maker. This fairly restricted assumption
hould be relaxed in future research to explore identifiability of
he obfuscation model under more lenient conditions, e.g. using
ontinuous distributions for the attribute-weights, specified over
larger domain of possible values.
We use the newly developed R-package Apollo (Hess and
alma, 2019a,b) for our analyses; our code is downloadable at:
ttps://github.com/szepteodora/obfuscation_identification. As a
tarting point for our analyses, we confirm – but do not report,
or reasons of space limitations – the obvious intuition that if the
nalyst is naive and if the decision-makers’ γ = 0 (i.e., they do
not obfuscate), the true attribute weights are recovered without
any problem. We then confirm – but do not report, again for
reasons of space limitations – another obvious intuition: if the
analyst is ‘naive’ and if the decision-makers’ γ > 0 (i.e., they do
obfuscate), the estimates for the attribute weights become biased,
and increasingly so as γ gets bigger. This finding is to be expected,
as in this case there is a mismatch between the utility function
used by the decision-makers and the one assumed by the analyst.
The straightforward and intuitive implication of this result, is that
when decision-makers obfuscate and the analyst is unaware of
that – and does not allow for it in the estimated choice model –
estimation results will be biased. In the – admittedly unrealistic
– case where the decision-makers obfuscate and the analyst is
‘informed’, i.e. knows the decision-makers’ obfuscation parameter
γ , we find (but do not report) that the true attribute weights are
being recovered.
Finally, we move to the most relevant and generic case, where
decision-makers obfuscate and the analyst is ‘prepared’, that is, he
allows for the possibility that decision-makers obfuscate, but does
not know whether or not and to what extent this has actually
happened (Fig. B.1a and b). Fig. B.1a shows that when this is the
case, the true attribute weights and the obfuscation parameter
are jointly being recovered by the analyst without noticeable bias,
even when the obfuscation parameter is large.
In other words, from the choices made by obfuscating
decision-makers, the prepared analyst can infer the presence
and degree of obfuscation, as well as the true attribute weights
which the decision-makers attempted to hide from the onlooker.
Fig. B.1b shows the standard errors of the estimates of the
attribute weights (and of the obfuscation parameter): these again
increase as a function of the size of obfuscation parameter γ .
This confirms the intuitive notion that a prepared analyst can
spot obfuscation behavior and simultaneously to recover the true
attribute weights of an obfuscating decision-maker, but with
an increasing lack of precision as obfuscation becomes more
pervasive.
It needs to be emphasized here, that the analyses and con-
clusions presented in this Appendix are to be interpreted with
care: although they show that in principle, obfuscation behavior
of decision-makers need not prohibit the choice modeler from
estimating his models without bias, further work is needed to
show that this interpretation indeed holds in general, as opposed
to only in the context of the carefully constructed Monte Carlo
simulation exercise on synthetic data which was presented here.
At this point, we briefly discuss two common misunderstand-
ings that may easily arise when inspecting the entropy-based
model of obfuscation-based choice behavior that has been pre-
sented above. First, one may be tempted to believe that ran-
domly picking an alternative without considering the attributes
of the alternatives in the choice set, would be a good obfuscation
strategy (especially in a repeated choice context), as it would
maximize entropy in the eyes of an onlooker. Second, one may
be tempted to believe that a process of variety seeking (Saviotti,
401988; Kahn, 1995; Alexander, 1997), in which alternatives are
chosen which have not been chosen before – or, whose attribute
values have not been chosen before – would lead to choice behav-
ior equivalent to obfuscation maximization, in a repeated choice
context. Both misconceptions are based on a single underlying
misunderstanding: in the obfuscation model presented in this
paper, entropy refers to the posterior probability distribution
of the underlying preferences (betas, attribute weights) of the
decision-maker, which he aims to hide from an onlooker. In the
‘random choice’ and ‘variety seeking’ models, the entropy refers
to the choice probabilities for alternatives. Crucially, an obfuscating
decision-maker is not so much concerned with the onlooker’s
knowledge about which alternative is likely to be chosen, but
with her ability to understand why he chose a particular alterna-
tive. In this light, it is clearly the betas’ entropy that counts, rather
than the entropy at the level of choice probabilities; see also
Eq. (3) where this notion is formalized. In fact, making random
choices – as well as, albeit in a more subtle way, variety seeking –
can be shown to be a poor obfuscation strategy, as it would make
a choice modeler conclude that all attribute weights are zero,
with high certainty (small standard errors); this would boil down
to deception, not obfuscation. Obfuscation behavior as presented
in this paper leads to very different choice behavior compared to
either random choice behavior or variety seeking behavior.
Note that the synthetic data set that is used for the identi-
fication analyses is based on simulated choice probabilities for
three alternatives, for each of the 10,000 decision-makers. (note
that the term simulation in this context refers to the fact that
the data are synthetic) In our synthetic dataset, the alternatives’
attribute values vary across decision-makers, but each decision-
maker is assumed to have the same preferences and obfuscation-
related beliefs. We here present a formulation for the simulated
probability that a particular decision-maker, faced with a choice
set, chooses a particular alternative (hence our notation omits a
subscript for decision-makers). For ease of communication, our
notation differs slightly from the one used directly above: we
now use the symbol β for a parameter which will be estimated
by the analyst; and we use the symbol β̃ for a parameter which
indirectly – i.e., through the entropy which the decision-maker
believes exists in the mind of the onlooker – determines the
behavior of the decision-maker, but which will not be estimated
by the analyst. Another small addition in notation concerns our
use of s to denote a state of the world. The decision-maker
believes that the onlooker assigns a prior probability of 1/9 to
each of the following nine states of the world:
β̃ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
β̃11 = 0 β̃12 = 0
β̃21 = 1 β̃22 = 0
β̃31 = 2 β̃32 = 0
β̃41 = 0 β̃42 = 1
β̃51 = 1 β̃52 = 1
β̃61 = 2 β̃62 = 1
β̃71 = 0 β̃72 = 2
β̃81 = 1 β̃82 = 2
β̃91 = 2 β̃92 = 2
(B.1)






























he decision-maker believes that the onlooker assigns the follow-
ng choice probability to alternative A from a set of three alterna-
ives {A,B,C}, given a particular state of world (β̃s) and given the





l∈{A,B,C} exp(β̃s1x1l + β̃s2x2l)
(B.3)
his implies, that the decision-maker believes that the onlooker
elieves that decision-maker maximizes utility and does not ob-
uscate. The decision-maker also believes that upon seeing his








































is as given in
B.2). Given these beliefs held by the decision-maker, his belief
oncerning the entropy in the mind of the onlooker, after she has













he decision-maker’s choice behavior (e.g. the probability that he
hooses alternative A from a set of {A,B,C}) is governed by the
ollowing Logit formula, which includes goal directed utility as
ell an entropy related term:
A =
exp [β1x1A + β2x2A + γ · IA {HA ≥ Hi∀i ∈ {A, B, C}}]∑
i∈{A,B,C} exp
[
β1x1i + β2x2i + γ · Ii
{
Hi ≥ Hj∀j ∈ {A, B, C}
}]
(B.6)
Here, entropy terms H are computed as given in (B.5). Similarly,
choice probabilities for alternatives B and C are obtained. Based41on these choice probabilities, choices are simulated for 10,000
virtual decision-makers, each making one choice given particular
attribute values for all three alternatives (see settings discussed in
Section 3). This data set containing 10,000 choices is then used by
the analyst for model estimation. It is important to repeat there,
that only parameters β1, β2, γ are being estimated by the analyst
in the stage of model estimation. In contrast, β̃s1 and β̃s2 which
are embedded in the Entropy terms (through Eqs. (B.1)–(B.5))
are pre-defined (see (B.1)), and they are not estimated. In other
words, the entropy term in (B.6) is computed prior to estimation,
based on each observation’s attribute levels, and subsequently
used as fixed input (i.e., ‘data’) in the stage of model estimation.
Appendix C. Instructions for the obfuscation game
I am going to explain the game. You have a sheet in front
of you which has the same explanation, so you can read with
me if you like to. You are about to play a game in duos. The
game consists of 10 rounds. In the game, there are two roles:
Decision-maker and Observer. We will randomly allocate you to
be either a Decision-maker or an Observer in the first round of
the game. These roles are switched between each round. So if you
are a Decision-maker in the first round, you will be an Observer
in the second round. So you are 5 times a Decision-maker, and
5 times an Observer. In the game you can earn real money. By
participating, you get at least e15 euros. Based on how you play
the game, this amount can increase. The game will consist of
10 rounds, and in each round you can earn a certain amount of
money. At the end of the game, 2 rounds will be randomly drawn:
one in which you were a decision-maker, and one in which you
were an Observer. The money you earned in those rounds, will
be paid on top of the e15. In this way, the money you earn can
vary from e15–e35. The money will be transferred to your bank
account after the experiment. So, as said before, you are going to
play in duos, 10 rounds in total. The task in each game round is
as follows. You see a matrix that displays 5 rules (the rows), and
5 actions (the columns). The cells indicate whether an action is
obliged, permitted or prohibited under a certain rule. The task of
the Decision-maker is as follows:








































You receive a card which states what you rule is in that round.
our task is then to choose an action from the matrix. You can
hoose any action consistent with your rule, i.e. not forbidden by
our rule. Your goal is to take an action such that the Observer
emains clueless as to which rule you follow. If you choose an
ction that leaves the Observer clueless enough to refrain from
uessing your rule, you will receive e10. If the Observer decides
o guess your rule, you receive e0, irrespective of whether the
bserver guesses your rule right or wrong. In sum: your aim is
o make sure the Observer remains clueless as to which rule you
ollow, and therefore not dares to guess your rule.
The task of the Observer is as follows:
You observe the action taken by the Decision-maker and based
n that information, decide whether or not to make a guess what
heir rule is. If you decide to guess and you guess correctly, you
ill receive e10. If you are clueless as to what their rule is, then
ou can refrain from guessing and receive e5. If you decide to
uess the rule, and you guess wrong, you receive e0.
It is very important to understand as a Decision-maker that
isleading the Observer is pointless. Your goal as a Decision-
aker is simply to choose an action, which makes that the
bserver does not dare to guess what your rule is. It makes no
ense, in terms of your chance to earn money, to let him or her
hink that you have a certain rule, which you do not have in
eality. In other words, you will earn no money for making the
bserver guess wrongly; you only earn money by making him
r her not guess at all. Also, there is no point in trying to win
rom your opponent. Your goal is to maximize the amount of





e0 • Refrain from guessing: e5
• Observer refrains
from guessing:
e10 • Guess rule of
Decision-maker wrong:
e0
• Guess rule of
Decision-maker right:
e10
Here is a simplified example of the task that you do in each
ound:
In this example, the Decision-maker is instructed to follow
ule R3. This means that he cannot choose action A1, as A1 is
rohibited under rule R3 (indicated by the cross). He can choose
etween action A2 and A3, as indicated by the checkmarks. The
oal of the Decision-maker is then to choose the action that leaves
he Observer most clueless as to what his rule is, so that the
bserver will refrain from guessing it. If the Decision-maker had
o follow R1 instead of R3 here, the ! indicates that the Decision-
aker is obliged to choose A1. Remember that in the game, it is
lso possible that as a Decision-maker, you receive a rule which
bliges you to choose a particular action (indicated by a !). This
as an example of the task that you perform together in each
ound of the game. For the succeeding of this experiment it is42important that you only say what is necessary during the game.
Apart from that, we ask you to not talk to your opponent. You
can also not ask questions to the facilitators during the game. It
is now time to start playing the game. You have the following
documents laying in front of you for this:
– A pile of choice task cards, with matrixes like in the example
above
– A pile of decision rule cards, with the rules the Decision-
maker has to follow
– A game form, on which you have to fill in some data after
each round of the game
– A sheet with game steps, that explains the steps that you
need to take in each round of the game
Please start the game by going through the sheet with game steps.
Remember to end each round by filling in the game form. Once
you are done with the entire game, you are free to so other
things—but please do not make too much noise such as not to
disturb those who are not yet done.
Procedure after the experiment, read out to participants at the
end of the game
All participants have now completed the rounds of the game.
Make sure that the entire form has been completed. As explained
at the beginning, you can earn money with this experiment. This
amount will vary from e15–e35. You each played 10 rounds.
We will now randomly draw two rounds from these 10. We will
draw one round in which you were a Decision-maker, and one
round in which you were an Observer. The money you earned
in those rounds will be paid on top of the e15 you received for
participating. The money will be transferred to your bank account
within two weeks after the experiment. We will publicly draw
the numbers of the rounds that will be paid, so that you can
see that this happens fairly. Before we are going to make the
draws, we will collect the forms that you filled out during the
game. If you want to, you can now make a picture of your game
form, so that after we drew the numbers of the rounds, you can
immediately see how much money you earned. So, we will now
randomly draw the numbers. First we draw one number out of
the possible numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, 9. Then we draw one number out
of the possible numbers 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. This ensures that one round
is drawn in which you were a decision-maker and one round is
drawn in which you were an observer. We do this with Excel.
*Show excel file*. As you can see, this file draws a random number
from the possible numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and a random number
from the possible numbers 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. This will be done in
the form of a classical raffle. Okay, we are done now. Based on
these outcomes, we will later today determine for each player
how much money he or she earned and we will transfer that
amount to your bank account within 2 weeks. Thank you all very
much for participating in this experiment. If you have questions,
you can come to me or one of the other supervisors available to
ask them.
Appendix D. Choice cards for the obfuscation game
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